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Millions of men and women are, through the American bail system,
held each year in "ransom" in American jails, committed to prison
cells often for prolonged periods before trial.

R.

GOLDFARB, RANSOM 1

(1968).

The methods we employ in the enforcement of our criminal law have
aptly been called the measure by which the quality of our civilization
may be judged.
Chief Justice Warren in Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,
449 (1962).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The last decade or so may justifiably be considered a revolutionary
period in American criminal jurisprudence.' During that time, the federal judiciary, with the United States Supreme Court in the vanguard,
continually rolled back the frontiers of procedural due process in criminal law, thus limiting the methods by which the awesome powers of
government may be brought to bear upon the individual accused of
crime. Generally speaking, this revolution has been aimed at restricting
the states from infringing upon most of the specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights. Federal courts have imposed these constitutional limitations on the states through the medium of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. As a result, the once vigorously argued "incorporation debate"' has for all practical purposes been laid to rest.
Thus, under the present status of federal constitutional law, the
operation of the criminal processes of the several states is subject to
most of the restrictions of the Bill of Rights. Specifically, the following
constitutional limitations now apply to state judicial process through
* J.D.; LL.M. candidate and Ford Urban Law Scholar at Yale University; former
associate editor, University of Miami Law Review; former Student Instructor, Freshman
Research and Writing.
1. See BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., THE CRIMINAL LAW REVOLUTION 1960-1968
(1968); BELLI, THE LAW REVOLUTION (1968).
2. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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the operation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment:
the prohibition of the fourth amendment against unreasonable search
and seizure (and the concomitant exclusionary rule);' the prohibitions
of the fifth amendment against double jeopardy 4 and compulsory selfincrimination'; the guarantees of the sixth amendment to a speedy
trial,' to a trial by jury for serious offenses, 7 to the confrontation of
opposing witnesses, 8 to compulsory process for obtaining defense witnesses,9 and to the assistance of counsel; 10 and the prohibition of the
eighth amendment against cruel and unusual punishment."
In addition to this package of constitutional rules governing the
conduct of the trial itself, stringent restrictions are operative at the
time of arrest and interrogation 12 and at other pretrial stages of criminal prosecution as well.'" Furthermore, the courts have expanded the
purview of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
impose upon the states the affirmative duty of minimizing the effects
of indigency upon a defendant in a criminal case. 4
Notwithstanding this judicial activism in certain areas of the criminal law, the courts have remained aloof from other problems which
might be characterized by low visibility but which are nonetheless
urgently in need of solution. Perhaps, foremost among these is the
dismal failure of the American bail system to secure for the poor the
full measure of benefits attributable to the legal presumption of innocence. The impact on the indigent defendant of the practice of requiring a-money bond as a condition of pretrial release is obvious: he
stays in jail, sometimes for periods longer than the sentence typically
imposed for commission of the crime for which he is charged.
But, despite this condition, which is widely deplored 5 and thor3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 785 (1969).
5. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965) (the "no-comment" rule applies to the states).
6. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
7. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
8. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
.9. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
10. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964).
13. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (a lineup is a critical stage of criminal
prosecution at which a defendant has the right to counsel).
14. See the discussion in regard to the equal protection attack on stationhouse bail

at section III, p. 822 infra.
15. See, e.g., R. GOLDFARB, RANSOm 4, S (1968) [hereinafter cited as RAsom].
The American bail system is a scandal. It typifies what is worst and most cynical
about our system of justice. It discriminates against the poor, against those who
advocate or represent unpopular courses of action. It compromises and prostitutes
the administration of justice by the courts. It is not only unfair; it is illogical;
it does not even work well. The bail system is to a great degree a socially
countenanced ransom of people and of justice for no good reason.
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oughly documented by legal commentary, 6 the courts have not been
responsive to this fundamental problem. Notwithstanding the valiant
service which has been extracted from the fourteenth amendment in
the aforementioned areas of the criminal law, a state of dormancy has
prevailed with respect to its application to the problem of pretrial detention of indigent defendants in state jails." Neither due process nor
equal protection have, in the hands of the courts, yielded an amelioration of the injustices wrought by the adoption in America of the fixedbond bail system. 8 Whether the evolution of a more humanitarian
national ethos in regard to the problems of poverty, and the development, pari passu, of a coresponding body of case law, have rendered
the fixed-money-bond per-offense system constitutionally vulnerable is
the subject of this comment.
Before undertaking to explore the constitutional ramifications of
certain aspects of the bail system, a note on scope and methodology is
in order. First, it is necessary to establish the relevant factual context
in which the legality of the bail system will be tested. For this purpose,
this paper will have recourse to the bail practices of Dade County,
Florida, although this is not a case study in the strictest sense. That is
16. Perhaps, the most definitive scholarly exposition on the subject is Foote, The

Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (Part I), 1125 (Part II.)
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Foote]. A very widely cited work written for comprehension
by both the lawyer and lay reader is RANSOM, supra note 15. Excellent brief treatments
of the problem are Ryan, The Last Days of Bail, 58 J. CRrM. L.C. & P.E. 542 (1967);
Comment, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and its Progency, 16
STAN. L. REV. 394 (1964). See generally, Symposium, The Bail System: Is it Acceptable?,
29 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005 (1968); Note, Bail or Jail: Toward An Alternative, 21 U. FLA. L.
RFv. 59 (1968). Legal literature abounds with other articles and studies on the American
bail system, and no attempt at exhaustive citation is made here.
17. Discussion in this paper will be directed primarily to the bail practices of the
states and therefore will raise the applicable constitutional issues under the fourteenth
amendment. The practice of the Federal system, while far from Elysian, is rendered much
more civilized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a) which requires the arresting officer to "take the
arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner . . ."
for a preliminary examination, the conduct of which is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(c).

Rule 5(c) further requires that "[t]he Commissioner shall admit the defendant to bail
as provided in these rules."
Adherance to this requirement of a prompt arraignment is encouraged by the McNabbMallory exclusionary rule. Unfortunately, however, the exclusionary rule does not obligate
the State of Florida to adhere to its own counterpart to FED. R. Calm. P. 5, which is
simply not enforced. Furthermore, this executive nonfeasance has received judicial approbation. This point will be further developed below. See note 40, infra and accompanying text. In any event, the constitutional principles that will be raised under the fourteenth
amendment will be fully applicable to the federal government through the operation of
the fifth amendment. This follows despite the fact that the fifth amendment contains no
equal protection clause since the due process clause of the fifth encompasses invidious
and gross discrimination. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
18. The bail system had its origin in England when the Statute of Westminster (1275)
first defined bailable offenses. The practice of pledging security for one's liberty developed
later and was administered on an individualized basis. The schedule of bail bonds is an
American engraftment which facilitates the administration of a mass criminal justice
system. See generally Note, Bai: An Ancient Practice Reeaxamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966

(1961).
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to say, Dade County offers a typical example of the operation of the
bail system in large metropolitan communities throughout the United
States, but the facts of Dade's practices are chosen primarily for illustrative purposes. Additionally, reference will be made to a civil rights
action filed in the United States District Court for The Southern District of Florida to permanently enjoin the operation of Dade's master
bond system because of its alleged constitutional infirmities.' 9
Finally, it should be noted that the scope of what is undertaken
here is relatively narrow. There will be no discussion with respect to
the question of whether there is a "right" to bail under the Federal
Constitution.' Although several inferior courts have assumed that the
excessive bail clause of the eighth amendment is carried over into the
due process clause of the fourteenth,2 ' the United States Supreme Court
has never ruled directly on the issue. In any event, speculation in the
legal literature22 is rendered academic by the fact that the right to bail
is granted by statute in the federal system,' 3 and by nearly all state
19. Ackies v. Purdy, Civil No. 69-1062 (S.D. Fla. 1969). The suit is a class action
brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) for declaratory and injunctive relief against the application of a master bond schedule to indigent defendants on
the grounds that it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment, and the "right" to bail under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. (In its
decision, unreported at the time of publication, the southern district did find the use of
the master bond lists to be violative of due process and equal protection, and the court
permanently enjoined the use of such lists unless the accused has first been informed of his
right to have conditions of release set by a magistrate and thereafter knowingly and
voluntarily waives his right to a hearing).
One of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in this action is Bruce S. Rogow of E.O.P.I.
Legal Services. The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the generous assistance of
Mr. Rogow, who provided resource materials and much of the original inspiration for this
commentary.
20. A literal reading of the eighth amendment yields no "right" to bail, as the
Supreme Court has observed:
The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act.
In England that clause has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases,
but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is
proper to grant bail. When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights,
nothing was said that indicated any different concept .

. .

. Indeed, the very

language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable.
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-46 (1951).
21. See, e.g., Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 965 (1964); Pilkinton v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir. 1963).
22. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 16, at 986-87, 1125. Professor Foote concludes, based
on an analysis of the historical evidence, that the only sensible interpretation of the
eighth amendment is that it creates a right to bail, not merely a limitation on amount in
those cases where it is set at all.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1964) provides:
[any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by death,
shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending trial
on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance
bond .....
The statute is unusually progressive in favoring the pretrial releases of accussed
persons without the necessity of posting a bail bond or deposit of cash. Such conditions,
among others specified, can be imposed, singly or in combination, according to the determination made by the judicial officer in the exercise of his discretion, which he deems
necessary to "reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trial. ... "
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constitutions. 4 Neither will there be presented any assertion that the
money-bail system is an unmitigated evil which ought to be abolished
in toto.25 In short, the scope of the discussion herein will be limited
to the questions whether the widespread practice among the states of
setting bail on the sole basis of a bond schedule without regard to the
particular circumstances of the individual case violates, when applied

to indigents, either the due process or the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
II.

OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM-THE INVISIBLE MAN

In 1958, an informal directive was issued by the Judges of the
Criminal Court of Record of Dade County, Florida, directing the
Sheriff of Dade County to set bail for defendants charged with crimes
triable in the criminal courts and in the justice of the peace courts
of Dade County according to a master bond schedule provided by the

judges of these courts."6 A similar directive was also issued to the
Sheriff by the Metropolitan Court of Dade County, for cases returnable
to that court." Changes in the master bond list are made from time
to time upon orders of the various courts.2"

Thus, upon arrest for a crime, the defendant is brought to the
Dade County jail where he is "booked," i.e., custody of the defendant
is transferred from the arresting officer or the transporting officer to the

booking officer at the jail, and the charges against the defendant are
recorded. As part of this booking procedure, bail is set by the booking
officer by reference to the master bond list which establishes bond
amounts for the most common offenses.2 9 No discretion is exercised;
the process is strictly mechanical. No inquiry is made by the booking
24. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1968):
Every person charged with a crime . . . shall be entitled to release on reasonable
bail with sufficient surety unless charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great.
This new constitution supercedes FLA. STAT. § 903.01 (1967) and the identical FLA. R.
CaRIM. P. 1.1130(a) which provide that "[aIll persons in custody for the commission
of an offense, not capital, shall before conviction be entitled as of right to be admitted
to bail. . . ." In any event, in all cases where the offense charged is not punishable by
death or life imprisonment, the right to pretrial bail is absolute.
Bail pending appeal is quite another matter, being severely restricted by statutory provisions. See Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-1, 2, 307.
25. The use of a master bond schedule is a great convenience for all defendants with
sufficient resources to meet the required amount because it permits them to secure instant
release. It is only the indigent who suffers for lack of a prompt preliminary examination.
See note 122 and corresponding text infra.
26. Complaint at § 7, Ackies v. Purdy, Civil No. 69-1062 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
27. Id.
28. Plaintiff's deposition of Jack Sandstrom, Supervisor of Correctional Div. of the
Pub. Safety Dept. of Dade County, Florida, at 14, Ackies v. Purdy, Civil No. 69-1062 (S.D.
Fla. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Deposition]. The master bond list is itself a compilation
of both oral directives and formal written orders of the Chief Judge of the Criminal
Court of Record, the Chief Judge of the Metropolitan Court, and the four individual
Justices of the Peace. Id. at 35.
29. Id. at 6 et seq.
..
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officer into the background of the defendant before bail is set. Thus, no
consideration is given as to whether the defendant has appeared or failed
to appear in prior cases in which he may have been released on bond. °
Neither is any inquiry made with respect to the length of time the defendant has resided in the county, his employment status, family ties,
income or assets."' The booking officer merely refers to the list for the
established bond figure for the offense charged, and the defendant
either makes bail (whether by posting the cash bond or by paying the
premium on a bond posted by professional bondsmen), or goes directly
to jail.12 He will reman there unless he can get the court to reduce bond.
Failing that, the defendant stays in jail until his court date. No judicial
determination as to the proper amount of a bond for the individual
defendant is made in a normal case. 3 Furthermore, nonjudicial assessment of the defendant's situation is not made with regard, for example,
to such factors as the apparent weight of the evidence against the defendant. Actually, such investigation by the booking officer is rendered
impossible by the fact that the transporting officer is frequently not the
arresting officer and thus has no personal knowledge of the case.84
To anyone who respects the law as a just and viable institution,
the most shocking facet of this "procedure" is that it constitutes a
flagrant violation of the law. Two Florida statutes relating to arrests
with and without a warrant unequivocally require that the arrested
person be brought before a committing magistrate "without unnecessary
delay. ' 3 5 Furthermore, "[w]hen the defendant is brought before the
magistrate upon an arrest, either with or without a warrant . . . ," it is
the statutory duty of the magistrate to conduct a preliminary examination unless the defendant exercises his right to waive it.8" The purpose
of a preliminary examination is, of course, to determine whether there
is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the offense of which he is accused. If cause is lacking, the defendant is to be
discharged from custody;1 7 however, if probable cause is found, "the
magistrate shall hold him to answer" and "[i]f the defendant is bailable as of right by the magistrate, he shall be admitted to bail."3 8 Obviously, if no preliminary hearing is held, all defendants who lack the
30. Id. at 10.
31. Id. at 10, 11.
32. Id. at 12.
33. For capital offenses and those carrying a penalty of life imprisonment, there is no
listing on the Master Bond Schedule and thus no bond is set at all at the booking. Bond
can, however, be set by a judge having jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 28, 29.
34. Id. at 41.
35. FLA. STAT. § 901.06 (1969) provides that in the case of an arrest pursuant to a
warrant, "the officer making the arrest shall without unnecessary delay take the person
arrested before the magistrate who issued the warrant. . . ." FLA. STAT. § 901.23 (1969)
requires that "[a]n officer who has arrested a person without a warrant, shall without
unnecessary delay take the person arrested before the nearest or most accessible magistrate .. ."
36. FLA. STAT. § 902.01 (1969); FLA. R. Canm. P. 1.22(a).
37. FLA. STAT. § 902.13 (1969); FA.R. Cnam. P. 1.22(b)(2).
38. FLA. STAT. § 902.14 (1969).
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means to make the bond amount required by the master list must continue to languish in jail until their cases come to trial. On the other
hand, those who have made bond suffer no prejudice from the lack of
a hearing because they have secured their pretrial freedom.
Notwithstanding the mandatory language of the statutes, however,
they are routinely not enforced,8 9 with the express condonation of the
Florida courts which adhere to the position that a preliminary examination is not essential to due process of law.4" Moreover, attempts
to require their enforcement, such as the contention that the McNabbMallory exclusionary rule be adopted, have been rebuffed."' Thus, as a
general rule no preliminary examination is conducted and bail is not
set, as required by law, by a judicial officer at a judicial proceeding.
Occasionally, however, bail is set or modified by a judge in an
informal manner. One possibility is that a defendant who is represented
by counsel may have his attorney contact the judge by phone to request
a reduction in bond from the amount set by the master bond schedule,
to set bond where there is no provision for it in the master bond list,
or to permit release on recognizance.42 Occasionally, the reverse of this
occurs; that is, the arresting officer may call the judge and request an
increase of bond over the master bond amount for a defendant he regards as too dangerous to be at liberty or otherwise a poor risk for
4
bail . 3

For indigents, however, the street is strictly one-way. The Public
Defender's office does not maintain a staff at the jail to consult with
persons booked into the jail, and it never interviews a prisoner until
assigned to do so by court order.44 Thus, the Public Defender does not
become involved in a case at the booking stage and cannot act in behalf
of the defendant for the purpose of securing a reduction in bond or a
release on recognizance.
A precise statistical portrait of the human effects of this procedure
is difficult to compose. According to the estimates of the Supervisor of
the Dade County jail, approximately 36,000 separate bookings into the
jail occur in a typical year, of which about 50 percent are for traffic
or other county ordinance violations. Of the remaining 18,000 cases
triable before the criminal court of record or justice of the peace courts,
the supervisor estimates that approximately 75 percent bond out, the
vast majority doing so through the services of a professional bondsman.45 The 75 percent figure seems a bit high in comparison with the
findings of a national field study" done in various communities across
39. Deposition, supra note 28, at 31.
40. Johnson v. State, 181 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).

41. Young v. State, 140 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1962).
42. Deposition, supra note 28, at 38, 39.
43. Id. at 37.
44. Id. at 39, 40.
45. Id. at 44.
46. Silverstein, Bail in the State Courts-A Field Survey and Report, 50 MINN. L. REv.
621, 634 (1966).
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the nation. The study found that in Dade County, out of a sample of
197 felony defendants, only 29 percent were released on bail.47 This
figure was significantly lower than the 47 percent average for a representative sample of large counties in the country, a large county being
defined as having 400,000 or more persons.4 s
In any event, the precise percentage of defendants released on bail
is not crucial, for it is beyond dispute that a substantial percentage of
defendants are unable to make bail."9 The consequence of such inability
is that the defendant remains incarcerated in the Dade County jail an
average of nearly 33 days between the time of arrest and his eventual
presentation to a court, and delays of 60 days or more are not uncommon.' The inescapable conclusion is that the effects of the bail system upon defendants financially unable to bail out of jail is to confine
them for a significant period of time, prior to the commencement of
any judicial processes. And, of course, the bail system entraps the innocent as well as the guilty, thereby destroying the value of the constitutional presumption of innocence."' This destruction occurs not only
because of the pretrial incarceration itself, but because defendants who
47. Id., Table 5 at 634.
48. Id.
49. Studies of the operation of the bail system have demonstrated that even
at the very lowest levels of bail-say five hundred dollars-where the bail bond
premium may be only twenty-five or fifty dollars, there is a very substantial percentage of persons who do not succeed in making bail and are therefore held
in custody pending trial.
Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 43, citing Attorney
General's Committee, Report on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal
Justice 67, 135 Table IV (1967) [hereinafter cited as Allen Report].
50. Affidavit of Richard N. Tilton, Ackies v. Purdy, Civil No. 69-1062 (S.D. Fla.
1969). The data was gleaned from the files of the clerk of the Dade County Criminal
Court of Record for the period between November 17, 1969, to February 18, 1970. Of
the sample of 126 defendants who were unable to make bond for one reason or another,
the average number of days of incarceration between arrest and initial presentation to a
justice of the peace or a criminal court judge was 32.92 days. The minimum period of
incarceration was 4 days, and the maximum 92.
51. The presumption of innocence has constitutional status, i.e., it is a requirement of
due process of law. In re Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1072 (1970). Nevertheless, those who
style themselves realists may object to the rhetoric in the text, as inconsistent with the
statistical reality that most persons arrested for serious crimes are in fact guilty. For
example, of the 300,000 persons charged with felonies each year, an average of 69% plead
guilty. Of the 12% whose cases go to trial, 80% are convicted. Combining these two
bits of data yields a "guilt factor" of approximately 79%. (Most of the remaining 19%
of cases are dismissed before trial.) L. SILVERSTEiN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR 9 (1965).
On the other hand, a substantial percentage of those accused are never adjudicated
guilty. See Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention. 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 641, 642 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Rankin] (27% of a sample of 358 jailed defendants were not convicted); Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L.
REv. 693, 727 (1958) [hereinafter cited as New York Bail Study] (20% of sample not
convicted). In addition, reversals on appeal often lower the proportion of defendants who
are legally not guilty.
Ultimately, the controversy is reducible to a conflict between two antipodal conceptions of the criminal process and the value accorded the abstraction of human dignity.
See Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 38-44 (1964), in
which the author posits two antithetical value systems-the Due Process Model and the
Crime Control Model.
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remain in jail pending trial are statistically significantly more likely to
be convicted than those who are released on bond.52 Furthermore, it is
obvious that pretrial loss of liberty has other adverse consequences on
the personal life of the indigent defendant, among which are loss of
employment, disruption of family life, and social ostracism merely from
being in jail, regardless of the ultimate disposition of the case."s
Before proceeding to the constitutional implications of this system,
it is advisable to emphasize that the procedures employed in Dade
County are not atypical and do not represent a deviant practice. On
the contrary, "in many localities . . . [there is] a fixed schedule geared

to the nature of the offense. As a rule, little or no inquiry or allowance
is made for individual differences between defendants based on the likelihood to appear at trial." 4 Stationhouse bail is "[o]ne of the most
prevalent forms of mechanical bail setting," and while it has the virtue
of insuring the prompt release of a defendant with money, it also raises
serious questions of fairness: "Set automatically on the basis of the
offense, it bypasses any effort to determine the accused's likelihood to
return and discriminates most forcefully against defendants without
55
money.)
All available studies confirm two dominant characteristics
in the national bail pattern: In a system which grants pre-trial
liberty for money, those who50can afford a bondsman, go free;
those who cannot stay in jail.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENsIONs

A. The Due Process Question
The practice of admission to bail, as it has evolved in AngloAmerican law, is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon
mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a
trial. On the contrary, the spirit of the procedure, is to enable
them to stay out of jail until a trial has found them guilty.
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 7 (1951)
(concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson).
52. Rankin, supra note 51. This study disclosed "findings [that] provide strong support
for the notion that a causal relationship exists between detention and unfavorable disposition." Id. at 655. The study was scrupulous in its attempts to isolate the effect of certain seemingly important variables such as prior record, amount of bail, type of counsel
(privately retained or court-appointed), family integration, and employment stability, and
concluded that "when considered separately [they] do not account for the statistical relationship between detention before adjudication and unfavorable disposition." Id. at 655.
The point is developed further at p. 822 infra. See also the foreword to this study, Wald,
Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Wald].
53. RANSOM supra, note 15, at 32.
54: FREED & WALO, BAn. iN Trn UmrrED STATES: 1964, 18-21 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as FREEa].
55. Id.
56. Id.

BOND
Query: Does the use of a master bond schedule to set bail in uniform amounts for a given category of offense without regard to the
particular circumstances of the case deprive an accused of his liberty
without due process of law? It has already been demonstrated that the
effect upon indigent defendants of this system is to keep them incarcerated for substantial periods of time," before the commencing of any
judicial processes. Certainly, this runs counter to elementary notions of
fair play, but is it also repugnant to the Federal Constitution?
The starting point of analysis is the proposition that, although it
is frequently utilized for a variety of other purposes,58 the setting of bail
has only one legitimate, i.e., officially sanctioned function, 59 to wit: to
ensure the presence of the accused at his trial and his amenability to
orders of the court resulting therefrom.
57. See note 50 supra.
58. "The system of bail is used also by society as a social and political weapon to
punish in advance of trial and sentence those it does not like." RANSOM, supra note 15, at
2. Goldfarb is not alone in perceiving a credibility gap. "Although bail is recognized in
the law solely as a method of insuring the defendant's appearance at trial, judges often
use it as a way of keeping in jail persons they fear will commit crimes if released before
trial." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADM.INISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 131 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CHALLENGE OF
CRIME]. "The Theory that bail serves solely to insure appearance for trial may be universally expounded by appellate courts, but the practice of trial courts tells quite another
story." FREED, supra note 54, at 11.
59. Despite the hypocrisy documented in note 58 supra and the corresponding text,
a legitimate case can be made for using bail to maintain incarceration of the accused
where he poses a threat to society, whether because of this propensity to commit another
crime, flee the jurisdiction, intimidate witnesses, etc. The practice has in fact received
judicial approbation. See Sellers v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 36 (1968) (Black, Cir. J.)
(dictum); Rehman v. California, 85 S. Ct. 8 (1964) (Douglas, Cir. J.); Carbo v. United
States, 82 S. Ct. 662 (1962) (Douglas, Cir. J.). It should be noted, however, that the
foregoing cases involve the question of a denial of bail pending appeal, which is distinguishable from pretrial detention because the presumption of innocence is destroyed
upon conviction.
In any event, it is quite clear that the case for pretrial detention has nothing whatsoever to do with the determination of the proper bail amount in a given case; on the
contrary, it is relevant only to the initial determination of whether to set any bail at
all. Furthermore, even a total denial of admission to bail affords the defendant minimal
due process guarantees because a hearing is held to consider the circumstance of the
individual's case; bail is not granted or denied, as in the manner of bail setting under a
master bond schedule, simply by reference to the name or category of offense charged.
Considered in this regard, the preventive detention bill now pending in Congress, S.
2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), would amend the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966,
18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (Supp IV 1964) to permit the denial of bail if pretrial release
would jeopardize the safety of any other person or the community. But even in that
event, a hearing would be required at which the full array of due process guarantees
would be afforded, e.g., the right to counsel and to cross-examination, the government
would bear the burden of proof of the defendant's alleged dangerousness, and a judicial
officer would have to make written findings of fact in addition to concluding that "there
is substantial probability that the defendant committed the offense with which he is
charged." Finally, the pretrial detention would be limited to a maximum of 60 days. For
a discussion and summary of the bill, see Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality
of PretrialDetention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1969).
Ironically, the safeguards included in a proposal to deny totally admission to bail
in limited circumstances far surpass in fairness the procedures, or lack thereof, employed
under a master bond schedule system, which purports to grant pretrial freedom.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIV

A recognizance of bail, in a criminal case, is taken to secure
the due attendance of the party accused, to answer the indictment, and to submit to a trial, and the judgment of the court
thereon.60
The foregoing conception of the role. of bail was articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in 1834, and more than a century later
that formulation was still adhered to in the leading case of Stack v.
Boyle."'
The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused's giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and
submit to sentence if found guilty. Like the ancient practice of
securing oaths of responsible persons to stand as sureties for
the accused, the modern practice of requiring a bail bond or the
deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence of an accused.0
Given this limited function, "the fixing of bail for any individual
defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of
assuring the presence of that defendant."6 These standards have been
recognized by the law for many years. For example, four traditional
criteria are adopted in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. They are
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the
evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give bail,
and the character of the defendant. 4 Under the 1966 Federal Bail
Reform Act,6" several additional criteria 0 were adopted in order "to
assure that all persons, regardless of financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their appearance ... , when detention serves
neither the ends of justice nor the public interest."6"
60. Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. 704, 710 (1835). Accord, Cheney v. Trammell, 65 Fla.
451, 62 So. 916 (Fla. 1913), State ex rel. Crabb v. Carson, 189 So.2d 376 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1966); FLA. STAT. § 903.12 (1967); FLA. R. Cam. P. 1.130(d).
61. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).

62. Id. at 4, 5.
63. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).

64.

FED.

R.

CRIM.

P. 46(c).

65. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (Supp. TV 1964).
66. In determining which conditions of release will reasonably assure appearance,
the judicial officer shall, on the basis of available information, take into account
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence
against the accused, the accused's family ties, employment, financial resources,
character and mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his
record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of
flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings.
Id. Ironically, nearly identical criteria are adopted by FLA. STAT. § 903.03(2)(a) (1969),
which only comes into operation after an accused is held to answer by a magistrate. Thus,
for indigents, the lack of a preliminary examination renders the statutory criteria for
pretrial release a nullity.
See note 59 supra, in regard to the proposed preventive detention amendment to the
Bail Reform Act of 1966, S. 2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
67. 80 Stat. 214 § 2 (1966).
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Obviously, the use of a master bond schedule necessarily means
that there are no "standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the
presence of the defendant." Under a master bond system, there is only
one relevant question: What is the name of the offense with which the
defendant is charged? To answer this question, of course, no inquiry
into the particular circumstances of the individual case is necessary. But
then, what of the principle that "[e]ach defendant stands before the
bar of justice as an individual"? 6" If this is indeed a principle of American jurisprudence, and not merely a rhetorically ringing but meaningless dictum, then one thing becomes absolutely clear: a hearing is
required by the Constitution before any substantial confinement may
occur. Although "[m]any controversies have raged about the cryptic
and abstract words of the due process clause . . . "69 there can be no
doubt that "[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the
opportunity to be heard."70 This proposition is so well ensconced in the
constitutional pantheon that no further citation is necessary.
It is sufficient to say that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard, as that
no man shall be condemned in his person or property without
due notice and an opportunity of being heard .. .
Not only is a hearing the sine qua non of due process for ideological reasons 7 2 but it also serves a vital pragmatic function as well. The
United States Supreme Court has characterized the hiatus between the
institution of formal charges and the commencement of trial as "perhaps
the most critical period of the proceedings . . . when consultation, thorroughgoing investigation and preparation [are] vitally important ...
Without this conditional privilege [of bail], those wrongly
accused are punished by a period of imprisonment, while
awaiting trial and are handicappedin consulting counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses, and preparing a defense."4
These are only a few of the impediments to the conduct of the
trial itself, and they are relatively obvious. In fact, the handicap placed
68. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 9 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
69. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
70. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
71. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898).
72. The second objective . . . [in addition to assuring the reliability of the guiltdetermining process] traditionally deemed a part of the due process of law is
more elusive and subtle. But its vitality is manifest in a number of requirements
not fully explicable in terms of the first objective. . . . Central to these requirements is the notion of man's dignity, which is denigrated . . . by procedures that
fail to respect his intrinsic privacy ....

Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism,
66 YALE L.J. 319, 347 (1957).
73. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).

74. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 7 (1951) (Jackson, J. concurring).
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upon a jailed accused in the preparation of his defense are overwhelming. But like a stone cast into a pond, pretrial detention has ever-widening ramifications.
The economic facts of the bail system go even further.
When the defendant who cannot afford bail goes to jail before
trial, he loses his present earning capacity, and often his job.
His family suffers. Some people have been forced onto relief
rolls as a result of lost earning capacity caused by pre-trial
detention. All of this happens before trial, without regard to
their guilt or innocence.
It is, in effect, punishment for the
75
crime of poverty.

Thus, the gravamen of the due process argument with respect to
a bail process that incarcerates the poor for substantial periods of time
before trial has two components: first, the confinement is tantamount
to punishment before trial, a flagrant violation of procedural due process
requirements; and second, its consequences are so prejudicial as to deny
fundamental fairness at trial. The latter proposition is a demonstrable
reality, as the following table illustrates:
TABLE 1
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DETENTION AND UNFAVORABLE DISPOSITION 7 8

Disposition

Bail

Jail

Sentenced to prison
Convicted without prison
Not convicted
Number of defendants

17
36
47
(374)

64
9
27
(358)

The statistics speak volumes, but perhaps in order to realize their full
impact it is necessary to verbalize them:
What is surprising, even shocking, is the fact disclosed by this
study that jailed first offenders not only are twice as likely to
be convicted and six times as likely to receive prison sentences
as bailed first offenders, but that bailed first offenders are half
again as likely to receive prison sentences as bailed repeat
offenders. According to this study, a defendant with a prior record who manages to obtain bail stands a far better chance of
probation or suspended sentence than a first offender who is
held in detention.77
75. RANSOM, supra note 15, at 32 (emphasis added).
76. Rankin, supra note 51, at 642. The sample is composed of felony defendants
charged in New York City during the years 1961 and 1962.
77. Wald, supra note 52, at 633. Further, prejudice may result from the ever-present
pressure on jailed defendants to plead guilty. One study showed only 74.6% of the bailed
defendants, as opposed to 89.6% of the jailed defendants, pleaded guilty. New York Bail
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With respect to the former contention, i.e., that loss of pretrial
liberty is punishment in advance of judgment, the conclusion is not

quite as compelling. The concept of due process requires a fair proceeding before a forum with jurisdiction prior to the rendition of final
judgment. This is obviously distinguishable from incarceration resulting
from inability to make bail pending the commencement of the trial.
Nevertheless, pretrial detention, apart from the prejudicial consequences
flowing therefrom, is not rendered less "final" in a nonlegal sense by
the absence of a final judgment; the time spent in jail is irretrievably
lost to the defendant.
At this juncture, comparison with judicial decisions which require
a hearing in administrative proceedings as the minimum requisite of due
process is illuminating. Thus, the courts have held that a hearing is re78
quired prior to discharging an employee from public employment,
prior to a revocation of a security clearance of a civilian employee,79
prior to a denial of admission to a state bar," prior to the expulsion of
operated school,"' and prior to the termination
a student from a publicly
82
of welfare benefits.
Keeping in mind that these are all nonjudicial proceedings, that
the consequences of administrative arbitrariness generally result in the
detriment of property rights rather than the loss of individual liberty,
and that the standards of procedural due process are, and should unquestionably be, more stringent in criminal proceedings, the compelling conclusion is that the failure of the state to accord a hearing prior to imposing pretrial detention is a deprivation of liberty without due process
of law. In fact, if it is true that "[plresentence liberty may be one of
the most significant rights that a free society can grant an accused," 83
there can be only one conclusion: In a society which ostensibly respects
the integrity of human personality, a person accused of crime has a
right to expect and to be accorded a prompt hearing for inquiry into
the individual circumstances of his situation before being condemned
by neglect to suffer pretrial imprisonment.8 4
Study, supra note 51, at 727. See Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964).
78. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). For an extensive
treatment of the due process requirement and its rationale in administrative proceedings,
see Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HRv. L. REv. 193 (1956).
79. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1958).
80. Wiliner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
81. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
82. Goldberg v. Kelly, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970).
83. Wald, supra note 52, at 631.
84. Consider in this regard the recommendation of the Presidential Comm'n on Civil
Disorders contained in the report of the Nat'l Advisory Comm'n of Civil Disorders-1968.
In chapter 13, "The Administration of Justice under Emergency Conditions," the Commission recommended a hearing for each defendant arrested under riot conditions:
When the riot defendant comes before the court, he should receive an individual
determination of bail amount. He should be represented by counsel and the judge
should ascertain from counsel, client and bail interviewer the relevant facts of his
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B. The Equal Protection Question
The American bail system discriminates against and punishes
the poor. The rich can afford to buy their freedom, and do; the
poor go to jail because they cannot afford the premium for a
bail bond.
R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM, 32 (1968).
Query: Does the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment forbid the fixed-schedule setting of bail without regard to the
individual circumstances of an "indigent ' 85 defendant on the theory
that it is an unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination? While no
case has directly considered this point, there is substantial case authority by analogy for the proposition that it is an unreasonable and arbitrary economic discrimination. Beginning in 1956, the Supreme Court of
the United States has rendered decisions in an unbroken chain of cases
which suggest the broad constitutional rule that any deprivation of fundamental rights incident to criminal prosecution which is based on the
poverty of the accused is a violation of the equal protection clause.
background, age, living arrangements, employment and past record. Uniform bail
amounts based on charges and riot conditions alone should be shunned as unfair.
Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
If this is the recommended procedure under riot and mass arrests where fixed bail
schedules would facilitate the awesome problem of processing the arrests, it should follow, a fortiori, that a hearing should be required in the case of an ordinary arrest.
85. A major definitional problem inheres in use of the word "indigency", which is
employed throughout this article. The establishment of satisfactory criteria for the determination of indigency is, of course, a necessary precondition to the achievement of a fair
bail system for the poor. Yet, a definitive answer to the question is rendered impossible
by the infinite permutations of financial status. A man with $100,000 in assets and
$101,000 in liabilities (and no current income), for example, is technically insolvent, while
a man with four dependents, no debts, and an annual income of $3,500 is not indigent,
although he falls below the Federal Government's guidelines on poverty.
The key seems to lie in liquidity, i.e., the possession or availability of cash. Thus,
for purposes of assigning court-appointed counsel, the prevailing test of indigency is
whether the accused is able to make bond. This, of course, brings us full circle to the
question initially posed. Suppose a defendant has a few hundred dollars with which he
can either hire counsel or post bond. Is he indigent for the purpose for which he does
not use the money? Further, should he be required to go into debt to raise the money
for either purpose? Suppose he has nonliquid assets, such as a car, which he uses for
transportation to and from his job. Should he be required to sell it? Questions of this kind
can be multiplied ad infinitum, and no very satisfactory answer for any of them is
apparent. See generally L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE FOR THE POOR 106-09 (1965).
For purposes of this article, the author will fall back upon the compromised but
liberal definition suggested by the Allen Report:
An impoverished accused is not necessarily one totally devoid of means. A
problem of poverty arises for the system of criminal justice when at any stage
of the proceedings lack of means in the accused substantially inhibits or prevents
the proper assertion of a right or a claim of right.
This definition is useful in a discussion of bail because it recognizes the concept of the
near-indigent or the person of insufficient means, rather than dwelling on the less common status of total destitution. For both, the emphasis must be on noneconomic factors
which demonstrate reliability for release without bond.
For judicial discussions of what constitutes indigency, see State v. Vallejos, 87 Ariz.
119, 348 P.2d 554 (1960) ; In re Patterson, 136 Colo. 401, 317 P.2d 1041 (1957) ; Pearlman
v. State, 226 Md. 67, 172 A.2d 395 (1961).
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This "new fetish for indigency," as Mr. Justice Clark scornfully
referred to it,8" began with the seminal case of Griffin v. Illinois.87 In
Griffin, full and direct appellate review from an Illinois conviction required at least a partial stenographic transcript of the trial. By a vote of
5 to 4, the Court upheld the contention that the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment required that all indigent defendants be furnished without cost a transcript necessary for
the prosecution of an appeal. Justice Black announced the four man
plurality opinion.
In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account
of poverty that on account of religion, race, or color. Plainly
the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence .... 18
It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide ... appellate review at all .... But that is not
to say that a State that does grant appellate review can do so
in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants
on account of their poverty.89
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has90
The principles of the Griffin case were reaffirmed in the case of
Douglas v. California." In that case, petitioners were convicted of 13
felonies in a California court. Thereafter, they appealed as of right to
the California District Court of Appeal and requested the appointment
of counsel to assist them. The request was denied, and the Supreme
Court of the United States held that such a denial was a violation of
their constitutional rights.
[W]here the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has
of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an
unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor. 2
Again, the leitmotif appeared: "[T]here can be no equal justice where
the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money
he has.' ),,9
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 359 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 18 (1956).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Id. at 357.
Id. at 335, citing Griffin. The view of the issues taken by the dissenters was
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The principles first articulated in Griffin and Douglas have been
expanded and further entrenched in a sequence of subsequent cases in
which the Court has invalidated many state provisions in criminal law
which impose intolerable burdens upon the poor man. In Burns v.
Ohio,94 for example, the Court invalidated the practice of requiring a
$20.00 filing fee before the Ohio Supreme Court would consider motions
to hear appeals of felony convictions. As applied to indigents, the fee
was held violative of the equal protective clause, based on the authority
of Griffin. "The imposition by the State of financial barriers restricting
the availability of appellate review for indigent criminal defendants has
no place in our heritage of Equal Justice Under Law."95 Similarly, in
Smith v. Bennett,"6 the Court held Iowa's statutory requirement that
a $4.00 filing fee accompany petitions for writs of habeas corpus to be
violative of the equal protection clause. The Court declared that "to
interpose any financial consideration between an indigent prisoner of
the State and his exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is to
97
deny that prisoner equal protection of the laws."1
Even procedures which impose lesser burdens of a nonmonetary
nature upon indigents have similarly fallen to the proscription of the
equal protection clause under the hand of the Supreme Court. For example, in Lane v. Brown,"8 Indiana's public defender act providing for
assistance of counsel to represent indigent prisoners in postconviction
proceedings was held unconstitutional. The defendant had unsuccessfully
filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the trial court. The
statute required the public defender's approval before an indigent
criminal defendant could obtain a free transcript of record which was
necessary to perfect an appeal from a denial of a petition for such a
writ. The case was decided on the authority of Griffin. In Draper v.
quite opposed to this line of thought. The opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, in which Mr.
Justice Stewart joined, put the whole controversy into sharp relief:
The States, of course, are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause from discriminating between 'rich' and 'poor' as such in the formulation and application
of their laws. But it is a far different thing to suggest that this provision prevents
the State from adopting a law of general applicability that may affect the poor
more harshly than it does the rich . . . . Every financial exaction which the
State imposed on a uniform basis is more easily satisfied by the well-to-do than
by the indigent. Yet I take it that no one would dispute the constitutional power
of the State . . . to impose a standard fine for criminal violations, or to establish
minimum bail amounts for various categories of offenses.
Id. at 361.
Laws such as these do not deny equal protection to the less fortunate for one
essential reason: The Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the States 'an
affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circum
stances.'
Id. at 362.
94. 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
95. Id at 258.
96. 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
97. Id. at 709.
98. 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
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Washington,9 the affirmance by the state supreme court on the sole
basis of a stenographic record of a hearing on a motion by an indigent
defendant for a trial transcript which was necessary for an appeal of
the trial was held to violate the equal protection clause because it did
not constitute a record of sufficient completeness as required by the
fourteenth amendment. This too was decided on the basis of Griffin.
Dispensing with the citation of numerous other cases, the proposition seems well-established that the denial or unavailability to an indigent defendant of important rights or procedures in the criminal
process which are available to the man with means is violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. But there is an
ambiguity in the broad meaning of this body of case law. It cannot fairly
be read for the strict proposition that in all situations the state must
afford precise economic equality in its criminal procedures. "Absolute
equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn and we often sustain them." 10 It may be that the more reasonable interpretation of these
cases is that, rather than being required to put all defendants upon a
footing of equality regardless of their financial status, the state need
only guarantee equal access to its established criminal procedures.
In all cases the duty of the State is to provide the indigent as
adequate and effective an appellate review as that given appellants with funds-the State must provide the indigent defendant with means of presenting his contentions to the appellate
court which are as good as those available to a non-indigent
defendant with similar contentions.' 0 '
What, then, is the lesson of these cases with respect to the question of setting bail for an indigent? In the absence of decisional authority
directly on point,'10 2 analogy to traditional judicial criteria for determining whether a classification violates the equal protection clause must
be relied upon. The traditional test states that equal protection is denied
only if the classification is "without any reasonable basis and therefore
is purely arbitrary."'10 3 However, where a classification relates to "funda99. 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
100. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
101. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963).
102. The financial inability of a defendant to make bail does not per se render that
amount excessive. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) ; White v. United States, 330 F.2d
811 (8th Cir. 1964). These cases do not, however, deal with the issue of whether the
setting of any bail for indigents is excessive or violative of equal protection. In the latter
regard, see Pelletier v. United States, 343 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1965). "It is an individous
discrimination to deny appellant release because of his poverty . . . ." Id. at 323 (Bazelon,
C.J., dissenting). Justice Bazelon takes the same position in Pannell v. United States, 320
F.2d 698, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Research has not disclosed a case where a majority opinion
has held that bail may not be required of an indigent defendant. See notes 114-19 and
accompanying text infra in regard to the opinion of Justice Douglas in Bandy v. United
States, 81 S. Ct. 197 (1960) (Douglas Cir. J.).
103. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); see Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), wherein the Supreme Court invalidated for want of a
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mental" rights, "its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter
standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest.' 'x0 4 Under
either test, the constitutionality of the master-bond-schedule method of
setting bail is suspect. The use of the master lists creates two categories
of persons; those who can afford the master bond bail and secure their
release from jail, and those who cannot. The question then arises,
whether this system of classification bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate power of the state, which is to secure the appearance of the
defendant at trial. It is difficult to find such a rational relationship in
the system, given the fact that the majority of bail bonds are procured
through the services of a professional bail bondsman. 0 5 In that event,
the premium once paid is lost forever, and the defendant who posts a
bail bond instead of the cash itself has no monetary stake in returning
to stand trial.' Furthermore, "the ability to pay costs in advance bears
no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could
07
not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial.'
Analogously, the ability to make bond bears no rational relationship to
the likelihood that the defendant will appear for trial. If, then, the
poverty of the accused is not a constitutionally permissible basis upon
which to deny him the guarantees of procedural due process at trial,
can it be sustained as the sole criterion upon which to deprive him of
pretrial liberty?
Even if the classification established by the master bond list could
pass constitutional muster under the traditional standard of a rational
basis, there is a much greater obstacle to be surmounted under the compelling interest test of equal protection. 0 8 Since the classification which
rational basis a New Jersey statute requiring reimbursement of costs from unsuccessful
appellants who were sentenced to prison, but not from those who were merely fined, put
on probation, or otherwise disposed of. "The Equal Protection Clause requires more
of a state law than nondiscriminatory application within the class it establishes . .

.

. It

also imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out."
Id. at 308-09.
104. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); see also Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 31 (1969).

105. In New York City, for example, nearly all bail isposted through commercial
sources. New York Bail Study, supra note 51, at 703-04.
106. See Ryan, The Last Days of Bail, 58 J. CRIuM. L.C. & P.S. 542, 544 (1967).
Technically, the defendant who defaults by not appearing for trial would be liable as
the principal on the surety bond. In reality, however, the only significant deterrent
against such default is criminal prosecution, whether by contempt citation or for flight
to avoid prosecution. The latter applies equally to those who pay a bail bondsman, post
a cash bond, or are released without bond. Thus, the rational basis for requiring a bond
as a condition of pretrial release isextremely attenuated.
107. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 18 (1956) (emphasis added).
108. [W]e reject appellants' argument that a mere showing of a rational relationship between the [statute] . . . and these four admittedly permissible state objectives will suffice to justify the classification . . . . [Aippellees were exercising a
constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise
of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest, is unconstitutional.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
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results from a master bond list relates to the asserted fundamental right
not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, the use of the
list must be scrutinized under the stricter test. In other words, the state
must show that a compelling interest is promoted by the use of the
master list without a hearing and its resultant classification. Given the

tenuous rationality of the classifications, it follows, a fortiori, that the
master bond schedule fulfills no such vital function. On the contrary,
the plausible conclusion is that the setting of bond for indigents solely
by reference to a master bond schedule, and without an individual hearing, creates an arbitrary, unreasonable, or invidious discrimination' 0 9
in violation of the equal protection clause. In short, the use of a master
bond schedule is inconsistent with the judicial command that "all people

charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an
equality before the bar of justice in every American court.' M10
To reach this conclusion, however, is not to solve the problem but

merely to raise a further question. If the fourteenth amendment prohibits pretrial incarceration of defendants who cannot make the bond
required by the master schedule, then what is to be done with them?

Unless the entire bail system itself is to be abolished, the states cannot
be prohibited from setting any bail for indigents, for that would produce
the absurd result of automatic release for indigents,"' but not for those
who merely lack enough money to make bond. It must be remembered
that the law grants a right to be released on bail" 2 and only requires

that it not be excessive."

But this is an empty guarantee for that per-

centage of the population for whom any bail is excessive.
Perhaps, the best approach to this conundrum is to adopt the
position advanced by Mr. Justice Douglas sitting as a Circuit Justice
109. "[Olur own constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection both
call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between
persons and different groups of persons." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
110. Id., citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1939).
111. See Walls v. Genung, 198 So.2d 30 (Fla. 1967), wherein the court rejected the
petitioner's claim that the requirement of a money bond (low in his case-$850) from an
indigent defendant was inconsistent with due process and equal protection because it
"would make of indigency a pass-key to all places of restraint to which he might be
committed prior to trial." Id. at 31. See also Ex parte Smith, 141 Fla. 434, 193 So. 431
(1940), where it was stated that it would be a futile gesture for the judge to grant a
motion for reduction of bond where it did not appear that petitioner could make bail
in any amount.
112. The right in Florida is granted by constitution, statute, and rule of procedure.
See note 24 supra.
113. Jones v. Cunningham, 126 Fla. 333, 170 So. 633 (1936). Reasonable bail is
determined by the circumstances of the case. Mendenhall v. Sweat, 117 Fla. 659, 158 So.
280 (1934). Ironically the latter case also holds that the fixing of excessive bail is tantamount to a denial of bail, and that a reasonable amount is one that does not "preclude
the probability of the ordinary citizen in like circumstances and conditions of those
of the accused being able to furnish [it] . . . ." Id. at 663, 158 So. at 282. This formula
is readily adaptable to facilitate the pretrial release of the poor by setting no bail or
low bail (e.g., $1). There is no Florida case authority for this proposition, however.
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in Bandy v. United States.1 14 Mr. Douglas first stated the problem in
a manner which provides authority, albeit by way of obiter dictum, for
the proposition that Griffin and its progeny may be specifically applicable to the problem posed115by the application of the money bail system
to an indigent defendant:
[The] theory [of bail] is based on the assumption that a defendant has property. . .. We have held that an indigent
defendant is denied equal protection of the law if he is denied
an appeal on equal terms with other defendants, solely because
of his indigence [citation omitted]. Can an indigent be denied
freedom, where a wealthy man would not, because he does
not happen to have enough property to pledge for his freedom? 1 6
Evading a direct answer to his own question, Justice Douglas went on
to say that "I approach this application with the conviction that the
right to release is heavily favored and that the requirement of security
for the bond may, in a proper case, be dispensed with. 1" 7 Douglas did
not, however, order Bandy's release without bond, which had already
been set at $5,000.00 upon a prior petition."' Bandy soon renewed his
application for release without bond, whereupon Justice Douglas delivered another important statement in the form of dictum:
Further reflection has led me to conclude that no man should
be denied release because of indigence. Instead, under our constitutional system, a man is entitled to be released on 'personal
recognizance' where other relevant factors make it reasonable
to believe that he will comply with the orders of the Court." 9
This, it is submitted, provides a reasonable alternative to the problem of how indigent defendants should be treated for purposes of admission to bail. Stated simply, a judicial examination into the individual
114. 81 S. Ct. 197 (1960) (Douglas, Cir. J.). There are actually three Bandy cases
concerned with bail. The complicated history of the litigation is set forth in detail by
Foote, supra note 16, at 1154 n.274.
115. The application of the Griffin rule to the bail problem runs, in skeletal form,
as follows. The State of Florida grants an absolute right to bail in all cases except those
where the offense is punishable by death or life imprisonment. In all other cases, there
is a right to bail, limited however, by the requirement of "sufficient sureties." Upon arrest
in the typical case, the only way to secure prompt pretrial release is to post a cash
bond or pay a bondsman to post it. This monetary requirement is a blatant economic
discrimination against the poor which is lacking in any rational justification, or, in the
alternative, which fails to promote a compelling state interest for its infringement of a
fundamental right, i.e., the right to pretrial liberty.
116. Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 198 (1960) (Douglas, Cir. J.).
117. Id.
118. Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 25 (1960) (Douglas, Cir. J.).
119. Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1961) (Douglas, Cir. J.) (emphasis
added). Compare this proposition with the statement in CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note
58, at 131, which goes even further in recommending that "money" bail should be imposed only when reasonable alternatives are not available.
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circumstances of the case should be held to determine whether the
accused should be released, the determination to be made according to
the sole criterion whether the defendant will return to stand trial.120 If
his appearance seems reasonably assured, then bail can be totally dispensed with or set in a nominal amount. This approach has the further
virtue of eluding the definitional problem of indigency. If, for example,
a poor, but not destitute, defendant can raise five dollars, and he is
otherwise a good risk for pretrial release, bail can be set in the nominal
sum.
Ultimately, the crux of the matter is the necessity of a pretrial
hearing at which such inquiry can be made. Thus, the solution to the
equal protection problem lies in the minimal guarantee of procedural
due process. Nevertheless, regardless of the constitutional label applied
to the approach, the important thing is that a conditional right of pretrial release should be established for all accused persons regardless of
income or wealth. This would make a reality of the Supreme Court's
pronunciamento that "the Fourteenth Amendment weighs the interests
of rich and poor criminals in equal scale, and its hand extends as far to
each.",121
IV. CONCLUSION

Having arrived at the conclusion that both due process of law and
equal protection of law are violated by the master-bond-schedule bail
system employed in Dade County and in many other metropolitan areas,
the next phase of inquiry shifts to focus upon reform of the repugnant
aspects of that system.
The author's suggestion is not that the master bond system should
be swiftly and totally excised; on the contrary, it is a device of great
social utility for those accused persons who have sufficient money to meet
the scheduled amount since it enables them to obtain instant release
from custody.' 2 2 What is necessary is a dual system of admission to
bail whereby those who cannot make the scheduled amount at the book120. If the state wishes to adopt a preventive detention measure for recidivists or
others about whom it is reasonable to perceive a threat to the peace and safety of the
community, it might pass constitutional muster if properly restricted. The real point,
however, is that in either case a prompt hearing would be held to determine whethe"
the accused should be released, and if so, upon what conditions.
121. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 714 (1961).
122. The same rapid release could also be accomplished without station house bond
if magistrates are located at the jail or wherever the booking is performed. This, of
course, would require the presence of committing magistrates on a 24-hour basis; however,
this represents the most progressive reform. But, since it entails considerable additional
expense for a jurisdiction that has no committing magistrate system, it is not likely
to be adopted. The best that can realistically be hoped for is a compromise version which
insures a prompt preliminary examination, preferably within twenty-four hours. Other
proposals have been even more tolerant of delay; the PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
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maximum delay of 72 hours. For this reason, station house bond should be retained.
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ing are given a prompt hearing at which a reduction of bond and/or
other conditions of release are considered by the judicial officer. In addition, those persons who were able to meet the stationhouse bail amount
could be examined to determine whether that amount is proper or is
in need of revision up or down in light of the individual circumstances
of the case.
To accomplish this end, existing machinery is adequate; all that
is required is the strict judicial enforcement of Florida Statutes sections 901.06 and 901.23 so that persons arrested will be taken before a
committing magistrate "without unnecessary delay.'

1 23

This, in turn,

12
almost certainly requires the adoption of the McNabb-Mallory rule
or some modified version, although statutory compliance might be
achieved through new legislation assessing penalties against police officers who violate their statutory duty. Recently, proposed legislation was
introduced into the Florida Legislature which was a hybrid of the two
approaches.125 Whichever road is traveled, the destination must be the
same: an absolute requirement of a preliminary examination promptly
after arrest, at least for those unable to make stationhouse bond.
At this hearing, which need not be an adversary proceeding (although the assignment of counsel to indigent defendants is desirable),
the judicial officer must inquire into all relevant factors of the defendant's background according to prescribed criteria. The standards set
forth in the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966121 provide adequate guidelines which Florida has already adopted in the from of Florida Statutes
section 903.03.127 Whatever the standards applied, the focus of the in-

123. See note 35 supra.
124. See note 17 supra.
125. H.B. 647 (April 11, 1969). The bill would require the presentation of the
arrestee within the first six daylight hours after arrest; failing that, he is to be released
from custody immediately. The McNabb-Mallory exclusionary rule is also included in
that "[any evidence obtained from the arrestee prior to his being taken before a committing magistrate shall be inadmissible in court." Finally, the failure of a law enforcement
officer to adhere to the requirements of the act may be considered an indirect civil contempt of court for which the arrestee may recover money damages against the officer
at the rate of $50.00 per hour.
126. See note 66 supra.
127. FLA. STAT. § 903.03(1) (1969):
(1) After a person isheld to answer by a magistrate, the court having jurisdiction
to try the defendant shall . .. have jurisdiction to hear and decide all preliminary
motions as to bail ....
(2) (a) The Florida parole and probation commission shall have the authority
and upon the request of the judicial officer . . . in whose court a person charged
with .. . bailable offense is held .. . to make an investigation and report to said
judicial officer, which may include the following:
1. The circumstances of the accused's family ties, employment, financial
resources, character and mental condition, the length of residence in the community;
2. His record of convictions and record of appearance at court proceedings or record of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court
proceedings; and
3. Such other facts as may be needed to assist
the court in itsdetermination of the indigency of the accused and whether he should be released on his
own recognizance.
(b) The judicial officers
shall not be bound by such recommendations.
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quiry should be the determination of conditions of release adequate to
assure the appearance of the defendant at trial. 128 The right to release
should be favored strongly, and those arrested of limited means ought
to be released on nominal bail: the completely destitute should be released on personal recognizance
or in the recognizance of another if they
29
are otherwise good risks.1
The adoption of these procedures will certainly not usher in the
millenium, but they can do a great deal to increase respect for the law 30
and to elevate the threshold of injustice that American society now
tolerates with such insouciance. Most of all, what is needed is an act
of reform which demonstrates convincingly that justice in the criminal
law is not the special province of the well-to-do.
We should say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a man's
mere property status, without more, cannot be used by a state
to test, qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United
States. "Indigence" in itself is neither a source of rights nor a
basis for denying them. The mere state of being without funds
is a neutral fact--constitutionally an irrelevance, like race,
creed, or color. 8'
128. Preventive detention for "dangerous" defendants or hard-core repeaters is also
a legitimate social objective, and niay be incorporated into the standards adopted for
the conduct of the preliminary examination. However, as stated previously, preventive
detention bears on the completely different question of whether to set any bail at all,
not the amount that should be set. See note 59 supra. It thus works no discrimination
among accused persons according to their economic status.
129. See Comment, Bail or Jail, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 59, 65-67 (1968).
130. No general respect for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected without judicial recognition of the paramount need for prompt, eminently
fair and sober criminal law procedures.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962). Consider specifically the disrespect
for law likely to be engendered by the nonenforcement of the Florida statutes which
require a preliminary hearing:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent, teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
131. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).

